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PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS IN NEW
MEXICO: THE RIGHT TO REFUSE SERVICE
FOR REASONS OTHER THAN RACE OR RELIGION
A recent influx of many persons non-conforming in dress, manners, and basic values-often referred to as "hippies" ' -may well
raise a question of first impression for New Mexico: is access to
public accommodations a recognized right? An answer to the posed
question will be drawn from common law cases arising from other
states, and a discussion of federal and state "civil rights" legislation.
Questions of racial discrimination in public accommodations are
largely beyond the scope of this comment because they concern
specific statutory exceptions to the general common law rule, and
because they are of sufficient magnitude to require a separate text
for an adequate discussion.
As a general rule the owner or agent of a public accommodation in
the absence of a statute to the contrary, may refuse admission or
service to anyone for any reason: indeed, he may refuse service without any reason.2 This is true even though the undesired customer has
an implied license to enter, and has already entered, since the proprietor is at liberty to revoke the license at whim, and may forcibly
eject such a person if he refuses to leave. 3 If the undesired customer
has paid an admission price and is asked to leave, his only remedy is
for breach of contract with damages limited to the admission price. 4
The rule has been used to exclude unescorted women from theaters,
servicemen from dance halls, persons non-conforming in dress from a
baseball park, drama critics from theaters, persons having purchased
tickets through ticketbrokers from ball parks and theaters, and
others the proprietor believed would be objectionable to his
patrons.'
There are two exceptions to the common law rule. Unlike restaurant owners and owners of other places of public accommodation,
innkeepers and public carriers are deemed to follow a "public calling" and are generally required to take all who offer to pay the asked
price. 6 The innkeeper's obligation is subject to many qualifications
1. Baer, Hippie Culture at Taos, New Mexico Review and Legislative Journal, June, 1969,
at 23, col. 6.
2. Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1165 (1948).
3. Annot., 9 A.L.R. 379 (1920).
4. Annot., supra note 2.

5. Id.
6. Id.
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and exceptions which appear to apply as often as the obligation
itself.7 The innkeeper's duty to accommodate those seeking lodging
developed at a time when roads were poor and towns and inns were
scarce. Because this is no longer true one writer has suggested that

the reasons underlying the innkeeper's obligation no longer exist.8
However, the same writer has questioned the validity of a state
statute abolishing the innkeeper's obligation on constitutional
grounds.9 This later position is dubious.' o
7. 15 U. Fla. L. Rev. 109, 112-14 (1962).
8. Id. at 127.
9. Id. at 117-26.
10. The writer's position is based upon an observation that either the enactment or the
enforcement of the Florida Statute-Fla. Stat. § 509.092 (1961)-abolishing the innkeepers
common law obligation would be "state action" within the meaning of the "Civil Rights
Cases." 109 U.S. 3 (1883). A passage is quoted from that case holding that the 14th
amendment prohibited all state action which (1) "impairs the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States," or (2) "which injures them in life, liberty, or property
without due process of the law" (emphasis added), or (3) "which denies to any of them the
equal protection of the law." 15 U. Fla. L. Rev. 109,120 (1962). It is then asserted (without
citation of authority) that "it can be said that the Florida statute 'impairs' the privileges and
immunities of citizens and 'affects' their rights and privileges." supra at 120-21: more about
this later. The note conceded that the statute does not deny equal protection of the laws;
but it is asserted, in reliance on Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), that the statute
deprives one of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
This later position appears as dubious as the first. Truax concerned an Arizona statute
removing the common law remedy for picketing. Any resemblance between Truax and the
removal of the common law remedy for being refused service at an inn is wholly superficial.
Turax relied on prior holdings that the right to conduct a lawful business is a property right,
and found that free access to the business for employees, the owners, or customers was an
incident of that property right which- is constitutionally protected against state statutes
which would injure that right without due process. Moreover, the Arizona statute was found
"arbitrary and capricious" and therefore lacking in due process. However, it must be
doubted that the right to be served at an inn would likewise be found to be an incident of a
property right. A property right to inn accommodations in the customer rather than the
owner would be most curious. It is also unlikely that the Florida statute would be found
arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of due piocess in light of the author's observation that
the reasons for creating the innkeepers obligation no longer exist.
However, Truax is not without a possible theoretical application to public accommodations, at least with regard to businesses other than inns or motor carriers and to statutes
abolishing the common law right of such other businesses to refuse service without liability.
It is far more likely that the right to refuse service would be found an incident of the
property right of doing business and therefore as constitutionally protected as the common
law remedy in Truax. However, statutes abolishing the common law right to refuse service
have been upheld as valid exercises of the state's police powers, (see Annot. supra note 2).
As for the unsupported statement that "it can be said that the Florida statute 'impairs'
the privileges and immunities of citizens... " it must be understood that that clause refers
to state impairment of the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. The SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The question is not whether the right to
accommodations in inns was a privilege or immunity of citizenship in Florida, as it clearly
was under the common law. The question is whether the right to be accommodated was a
right of national citizenship, and no case so holds.
Clearly national citizenship does carry with it an immunity from state action predicated
on race or color (The Civil Rights Cases), or state action enforcing private discrimination
because of race (State v. Brown, 195 A.2d 379 (Del. 1963), see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
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New Mexico has no case law binding the judiciary to recognize an
obligation on the part of innkeepers to receive anyone seeking accommodations, and it may well be that such an obligation will never
be recognized absent those conditions originally responsible for the
creation of the innkeeper's obligation. Because it is clear that innkeepers are prohibited from discriminating because of "race, religion,
color, national origin or ancestry,"'' it may be doubted whether
New Mexico courts would find any pressing need to create such an
obligation on the part of innkeepers.
Other businesses-falling under the general rule rather than the
innkeepers' exception-can undoubtedly refuse service to anyone not
protected by federal or state statutory provisions. I2
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was the first federal effort to create a
right to equal enjoyment of public accommodations.' I It contained
broad language seemingly susceptible of an interpretation which
rather than simply prohibiting particular types of discrimination,
would create a right to service or accommodations for everyone,
subject only to exceptions which were both to be established by law
and applicable alike to all races:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on
land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and
applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any
previous condition of servitude.14
However, the language received a narrower construction. The
Supreme Court, in the Civil Rights Cases, I ' interpreted the language
as not creating a broad right to public accommodations, but as only
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race or color.
The essence of the law is, not to declare broadly that all persons
shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyU.S. 1 (1948)), but it does not necessarily follow that the common law rules regarding
accommodations in inns are vested in national citizenship. Privileges and immunities protected by the 14th amendment are those arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States as contrasted with those that arise under other sources. Hamilton v. Regents
of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934). The common law of the various states
is one such other source.
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 4-33-2 (G) and 4-33-7 (F) (Supp. 1969).
12. 7 St. Louis U.L.J. 88, 89 (1962).
13. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, § § 1-5, 18 Stat. 335.
14. Id. § 1, 18 Stat. 335, 336.
15. 109 U.S. 3 (1883)
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ances, and theaters; but that such enjoyment shall not be subject to
any conditions applicable only to citizens of a particular race or
color, or who had been in a previous condition of servitude.' 6
The court held that the statute was unauthorized by the 14th
amendment-which only prohibited "State action" ' "-and was unauthorized by the 13th amendment-which prohibited slavery, not
acts of private discrimination' I -and therefore was unconstitutional.
But, the Court expressly did not rule on the question of whether the
regulation of public accommodations, when within the scope of
interstate commerce, could be sustained.' 9 The 1875 statute was not
felt to raise such a question, but clearly the Court felt such regulation permissable.2 0
The historical expansion of the concept of interstate commerce
provided a basis for the second federal effort to regulate public
accommodations. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 differed from its
1875 predecessor in that it was clearly drafted to be a regulation of
interstate commerce which contained as well a prohibition of racial
discrimination supported by state action, 2' and the statute has been
upheld on that basis. 2 2
However, the public accommodations section of the 1964 Act
only prohibits discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, or
'
national origin""3
rather than creating a broad right of access to
such accommodations. Clearly the Act does not abolish the common
law rule generally allowing a business to refuse service to anyone, but
rather creates specific exceptions to the rule for certain types of
discrimination.2 4 For example, while the Act does prohibit either
racial or religious discrimination in public accommodations involved
with interstate commerce, it does not prohibit discrimination based
on sex.' s So long as the business refuses service for reasons other
than "race, color, religion, or national origin," the federal law is not
applicable.
State statutes regulating access to public accommodations are of
essentially two kinds. One, such as California's statute,2 6 provides a
16. Id. at 9-10.
17. Id. at 10-19.
18. Id. at 20-25.
19. Id. at 19.
20. Id. at 18.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1964).
22. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1000(a) (a) (1964).
24. Comment, supra, note 12.
25. DeCrow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., 288 F. Supp. 530 (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
26. Cal. Civ. Code § § 51-54 (West 1954); see Stoumen v. Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234,
P.2d 969 (1951).
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broad right of enjoyment of public accommodations applicable to all
persons. The other only prohibits particular kinds of discrimination,
e.g., New Mexico's Human Rights Act. 2 7
It should be noted that like the federal statute the kinds of discrimination prohibited in New Mexico vary somewhat with the type
of activity being regulated. For example, it is unlawful for an employer, except upon a bona fide occupational qualification, to
discriminate because of either age or sex, 2 while a labor organization may discriminate on the basis of age but not sex,2 9 and a public
accommodation is not prohibited from discriminating on either
3
basis.

0

The New Mexico Human Rights Act only prohibits its discrimination in public accommodations because of "race, religion, color,
national origin or ancestry."' "Public accommodation" is broadly
defined as "any establishment that provides or offers its service,
facilities, accommodations, or goods to the public, but does not
include a bona fide private club or other place or establishment
which is by its nature and use distinctly private." 3 2 Indeed, the
definition appears sufficiently broad to cover the "residence or sleeping place of any individual" and "land rented or leased for the use,
parking, or storage of house trailers" which are included respectively
in the definitions of "Housing accommodation ' 3
and "Real
property" 3 4.
Conceivably the overlapping definitions could pose problems: Is a
motel room "the residence or sleeping place of any individual" and
thus a "housing accommodation" or is it a "service, facility, or
accommodation" and thus a "public accommodation?" Fortunately
the question is rendered academic by the fact that the statutory
provision governing "housing accommodation" and "real property"
prohibits exactly the same kinds of discrimination prohibited by the
provision governing "public accommodations." 3
Unlike the New Mexico Civil Rights Act of 1955,36 the Human
Rights Act, which repealed it contains no language that could be
interpreted as prohibiting discrimination because of long hair, shabby
dress, or outrageous costume. The prior Act prohibited discrimina27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 4-33-1 to -13 (Supp. 1969).
Id. § 4-33-7 (A)
Id. § 4-33-7 (B)
Id. § 4-33-7 (F)
Id. § 4-33-7 (F)
Id. § 4-33-2 (G)
Id. § 4-33-2 (H)
Id. § 4-33-2 (I)
Id. § 4-33-7 (G) to (H)
Laws of N.M. 1955, ch. 192, § § I to -7.
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tion for reasons of "race, color, religion, ancestry or national

origin" ' '

but it also contained language which could possibly bd

interpreted as creating a broad civil right to public accommodations:
49-8-2. Declaration of civil right-All persons shall have the right
to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and
privileges of any place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement within the state of New Mexico subject only to the conditions
and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons.
This right is recognized and declared to be a civil right.3"

Curiously, the above "Declaration of civil right" differs completely from the Act's "Declaration of policy" which was narrowly
stated as to "prohibit discrimination in places of accommodation,
resort or amusement due to race, religion, ancestry or national
origin."" The discrepancy between the "Declaration of civil right"
and the "Declaration of policy" was never resolved in court and
perhaps the confusion was in part responsible for the hesitancy of
many attorneys to advise their clients that they may refuse service
for any reason other than "race, color, religion, ancestry or national
origin." Since the present act, while prohibiting discrimination because of "race, religion, color, national origin or ancestry," omits the
confusing "declaration of a civil right" that hesitancy need not continue.
While the previous discussion shows that state and federal law
allows private discrimination for reasons other than race or religion,
there remains one question: is the result acceptable? The question is
not purely academic. Shelley v. Kraemer4" recognized a dichotomy
between state created rights and permissible state remedies. The state
sanctioned right-a racially restrictive covenant-was not rendered
invalid, but merely unenforcible in state courts, upon a finding that
the property agreement embodied a pattern of racial discrimination
which would have been in violation of the equal protection clause
had the pattern been dictated by the state itself. The reasoning was
that state judicial action is state action, and therefore state enforcement, as well as state creation(.f patterns of discrimination impermissible under the equal protection clause is prohibited. Thus the
Shelley v. Kraemer approach to refusing service to "hippies" would
turn on whether such exclusion would be a violation of equal protection if dictated by the state. If such is the case, service could be
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. ch. 192, § 1.
Id. ch. 192, § 2;seealso Stoumenv. Reilly, 37 Cal.2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951).
Laws of N.M. 1955, ch. 192, § 1.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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refused, but the proprietor could not rely on the police or the courts
to eject the person if such ejection became necessary. 4'
The Shelley v. Kraemer approach was presented as an illustration
of how the social desirability of allowing private persons to discriminate on the basis of appearance could take on legal significance.
This approach will not be further pursued for a number of reasons.
First, the possibility of such an approach actually taking on legal
significance is somewhat remote. Undoubtedly a proprietor can
effectively discriminate against "hippies" without resorting to state
action, since rarely would he be forced to use the public or courts to
eject the undesired person.
. Second, the approach is much too narrow. Whether such discrimination would deny equal protection if enforced by state action
depends upon the rationality or irrationality of the distinctions relied
upon. 4 2 Whether the distinctions relied upon in discrimination
because of appearance are reasonable or not is but a part of the
broader question of the desirability of allowing discrimination by
private persons for reasons other than race or religion.
Thirdly, since the willingness of the Supreme Court to engraph its
indignation upon the fourteenth amendment can no longer be
doubted, it is necessary to take the broader view to ascertain whether
any reason for indignation exists.
What is involved when a merchant refuses service to a "hippy"? Is
it just an unthinking emotional reaction to a totality of unconventional dress and mannerisms, or is it a calculated or perhaps instinctive guess that the undesired "customer" will be offensive to other
patrons or otherwise a detriment to the business?
It seems clear that when someone resembling a "hippy" enters a
place of public accommodation the proprietor does not first seek to
classify him as a "hippy" or a "non-hippy" with an eye toward
excluding him if he fits the classification and serving him if he does
not. The classification is not relevant. The merchant's reaction is a
sanction against whatever public display of non-conforming dress,
manners, or speech offended him in that particular individual, just as
it must be recognized that the appearance of the "hippy" is probably
a sanction against somewhat more nebulous objects: the "establishment," society, or whatever. If this observation is fair, then the
question of allowing private discrimination for reasons other than
race or religion is essentially a question of private sanctions.
Private sanctions would appear to be an unclassified area of the
41. Cf State v. Brown, 195 A.2d 379 (Del. 1963).
42. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 10

law-or non-law-occasionally overlapping torts, criminal law, labor
law, property law, contracts, etc., but generally an area where the
law leaves people to their own devices, at least so long as the sanctions imposed do not overlap one of the recognized classifications of
law. This delightful area is the happy home of the sophisticated
insult, the common snub, the wisecrack, the deliberate social blunder, the withdrawn invitation, the inappropriate costume, the long
neglected bath, the upstage, the obscene gesture (unless criminally
obscene), the unflattering comparision of one's mother to the female
dog, and any other device by which people express their contempt or
disapproval without crossing into the forbidden area of the personal
tort or the criminal misdemeanor or felony.
A natural reaction to such devices is retaliation with some other
sanction, including the termination of whatever voluntary relations
existed or were anticipated between the persons. Thus all of the
mentioned devices have probably resulted in an employee indignately
quitting, an empl6yee fired, a refusal to renew a contract or to
continue to do business, and a refusal to accept or to offer services or
accommodations.
Admittedly the common law imposed limits on what sanctions
were permissible by creating actions for personal torts and by recognizing common law crimes. Admittedly new limits have been
imposed on the permissible sanctions in some areas. For example,
New Mexico prohibits blacklisting of ex-employees. 4 And admittedly arguments can be made that all persons should be guarnateed service at public accommodations regardless of how offensive
their appearance is to other customers. Not only is such a policy
conceivable, it is the law in California.4" However, to consider it
only constitutionally permissible policy is to become unreasonably
indignant over a private sanction which is at least as valid as the
sanction of society (and the merchant) implicit in the long hair,
shabby dress, and outrageous costume to which the merchant is
reacting.
Indeed, judicial indignation would be understandable where the
sanction (i.e., a refusal of service) was imposed for race or some
other reason over which the undesired customer has no control. Here
the discrimination is because of offensive dress or manicure which is
readily altered. There is a matter of conviction; of strongly not wanting to cut one's hair, but it seems at least matched by the conviction
of strongly not wishing to be near or to serve someone whom you
feel offensive.
43. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-13-3 (Repl. 1964).
44. Cal. Civ. Code § § 51-54 (West 1954).
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There are undoubtedly those who consider it an outrage that one
must cut his hair, bathe, and wear conventional dress as a condition
of service in some public accommodation upon which the person
conceivably may be temporarily dependent for necessities of food or
lodging. But undoubtedly the merchant, and many who sympathize
with him, would consider it an outrage that he must serve "hippies"
as a condition of continuing in a business upon which he is definitely
dependent for his necessities of life. It is'clear that a choice must be
thrust upon either the "hippy" or the merchant: if the choice
remains upon the "hippy" he must choose between his preference
for his appearance and his preference for assured access to services
and accommodations; if the choice is shifted to the merchant, he
must choose between his preference for selecting his customers and
his desire to remain in business. It is doubtful that conforming in
appearance can be more distasteful to the "hippy" than losing the
right to select his customers would be to the merchant, and it is
certain that the merchant's loss of his livelihood is a greater burden
than the refusal of services to a "hippy".
It seems that the better view is that refusal to provide service or
accommodations properly belongs in the area of private sanctions for
which there is no remedy, as simply a refusal to enter into a strictly
voluntary relationship. A contrary policy is arguable, but certainly
should not be regarded as a constitutional necessity.
Federal law prohibits discrimination in public accommodations
within the scope of interstate commerce for reasons of "race, color,
religion, or national origin," and state law prohibits discrimination in
public accommodations for reasons of "race, religion, color, national
origin or ancestry." Because the kinds of discrimination prohibited
by the two statutes are essentially the same, it is not necessary to
determine whether a particular business is involved in interstate commerce before determining whether any discrimination being practiced is lawful. Both statutes alter the common law rule generally
allowing discrimination for any reason or without reason only to the
extent of prohibiting racial or religious discrimination. All other
types of discrimination remain lawful in New Mexico.
VERN JOHN WILLIAMS, JR.

